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Abstract
The advent of Internet of Things (IoT) technology
exponentially increases the collection of new
information types in consumers’ lives from various
sensors. However, many consumers do not fully
recognize the potential privacy and security risks
(PSR) associated with IoT. Those who are aware
rarely take action to protect their personal
information because of a cognitive gap between PSR
and its impact. To address this problem, we propose
a design framework for evaluating and quantifying
IoT PSRs related to IoT adoption. Grounded in the
cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) and information
processing theory (IPT), the proposed framework
defines IoT PSR scores and proposes a visual
representation for improving consumers’ awareness
of PSRs. Furthermore, we suggest a PSR control
balance theory (PSR-CBT) to explicate the
consumers’ two internal power conflicts. The
proposed PSR scores can reduce consumers’
cognitive gaps, and thus, help them make informed
purchase decisions toward IoT devices and services.

1. Introduction
The rapid evolution of the Internet and the explosion
of Internet of Things (IoT) technology has made life
very convenient for people, but at the same time,
such technological advances posed new challenges to
privacy and security protection. Beyond expanding
traditional person-to-person communication, IoT
extensively uses a vast array of sensors that are the
objects of communication for person-to-things and
things-to-things communications, as well as existing
cellular communication and wireless technologies,
such as Bluetooth (BT), Wi-Fi, and Zigbee [1]. Many
consumers are attracted to its new features and
convenience, either knowingly or unwittingly
disclosing their personal information. Sometimes,
they are not even aware of personal information
leaks. CNN reported IoT privacy and security issues
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in 2019: “Not only is Alexa listening when you speak
to an Echo smart speaker, an Amazon employee is
potentially listening, too” [2].
As a result of IoT privacy and security problems,
there is a great demand for mechanisms to protect
IoT privacy and security. For the IoT security
markets, Gartner predicts that, “worldwide IoT
security spend will increase from $912M in 2016,
soaring to $3.1B in 2021, attaining a 27.87% CAGR
in the forecast period” [3].
IoT technology not only collects a massive
amount of consumers’ information, but it is also
capable of understanding and predicting their
behaviors. IoT devices are inherently small and cheap
with limited privacy and security protection functions
because strong protection systems in hardware and
software cannot be embedded in a small and cheap
device [4]. Thus, the privacy and security risks (PSR)
of using IoT technology are much more significant
than those of conventional electronic home devices.
Consequently, IoT experts have warned consumers
about the privacy and security vulnerabilities of IoT.
Despite the vulnerability of IoT devices and services,
it seems that in some cases, IoT PSRs do not appear
to have an influence on the consumers’ intention to
purchase and use IoT. This is due to consumers’
cognitive gaps and lack of awareness of privacy risks
and security vulnerabilities related to IoT [5].
To reduce consumers’ cognitive gaps and
improve the awareness of PSRs, we propose a new
mechanism for assessing IoT PSRs, namely personal
PSR scores. We determine the PSR scores by
collectively considering consumers’ IoT information
types, weight impact factors, and personal
capabilities. Furthermore, we will propose a new
design theory for personal PSR assessment that can
be used to explain how consumers internally make a
disclosure decision [6]. Because a design science
research (DSR) concentrates on developing solutions
to problems [7], a DSR approach is suitable for the
development of our proposed PSR scores and theory.
We adopt the information systems design theory
(ISDT) because ISDT allows us to apply a set of
requirements and designs for a solution. In addition,
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we adopt the publication schema for DSR [8, 9, 10],
which guides us to communicate with prior literature.

2. Literature Review
In this section, we review previous literature to
demonstrate consumers’ paradoxical behaviors
between their attitudes toward PSRs and their actual
IoT purchase and use behaviors. The objective is to
analyze existing PSRs in the literature and identify
new types of IoT PSRs that pose a threat to
consumers. We then propose a new artifact as a
solution to minimize the cognitive gap and increase
consumers’ awareness of PSRs.
The consumers’ paradoxical behaviors in PSRs
occur when the potential risks related to IoT often
have little influence on consumers’ purchase and use
behaviors, until consumers experience serious and
adverse consequences (e.g., identify theft).
Consumers are limited as to how they manage their
IoT PSRs, although they might think that they can
control the risks [11]. According to a poll conducted
in 2018, even though more than 70 percent of
consumers believe that privacy for their data is
extremely important and would not purchase
products and services from an invasive company, few
consumers take actual behaviors to protect their
personal information [5]. This survey shows a
cognitive gap between consumers’ attitudes and
actual behaviors toward PSRs. Many scholars have
researched the cognitive gap as a privacy paradox
and agreed that the awareness of PSRs is negatively
associated with paradoxical behaviors toward PSRs.
Barth and Jong [12] suggest that “creating privacy
awareness in combination with tools that support
users in their privacy decisions should help users to
avoid paradoxical behavior.” Kennedy-Lightsey and
Martin [13] claim “perceived risk is key to
individuals’ disclosure decisions.” Therefore, our
study focuses on improving consumers’ awareness of
IoT PSRs, and ultimately minimizing consumers’
cognitive gaps between their attitudes toward IoT
PSRs and their purchase and use behaviors.
In order to assess privacy risks, prior literature
classified consumer-disclosed information into six
information types: (1) demographic information, (2)
contact information, (3) vehicle information, (4)
lifestyle, interests, and activities data, (5) financial
and economic data, such as estimated income and
home value, and (6) financial and credit data, such as
credit score, loan, and credit card data [14]. However,
the categorization fails to capture new types of data
collected and transmitted by IoT devices, such as
consumers’
behavioral
tendencies,
real-time
locations, and schedules.

Existing tools for raising privacy and security
awareness are also insufficient for IoT devices.
Belanger et al. [15] designed online parental consent
for kid’s electronic transactions (POCKET), which is
a practical software solution to protect children from
online privacy risks and threats. POCKET allows
parents to choose a specific user privacy preferences
file (UPPF) that includes the child’s name and 27
specific preferences, including the child’s first name,
last name, email, address, zip code, parents’ credit
card numbers, and so forth [15]. Although UPPF
contains detailed information about the child, it only
focuses on basic demographic information.
Ananthula, et al. [16] suggested a method to
measure privacy risks in an online social network. It
calculates privacy quotient based on the sensitivity
and visibility of the information shared by a user.
Besides, they propose a privacy index (PIDX) used to
measure the level of exposure of privacy. Some
scholars have studied the degree to which users
disclose their privacy as a score in multiple online
social network environments, called the privacy
disclosure score (PDS). With calculated PDS, they
can analyze the user’s potential information loss.
Morando, et al. [17] have integrated a variety of
privacy evaluation studies with empirical research
results on personal data evaluation.
Although there are privacy risk evaluation
studies, most previous privacy scoring models focus
on the context of social media, rather than the context
of IoT technology. Prior literature regarding privacy
scoring models has not considered the vulnerabilities
of IoT and the new information types that users
normally do not encounter in social media. IoT
broadly collects consumers’ activity data, such as
purchasing habits, emotions, real-time location data,
and schedules, all of which put the users at PSRs
from inappropriate manipulation and secondary use
by vendors [18, 19, 20].

3. A Design Science Approach
This study adopts ISDT and the publication schema
for a DSR study suggested by Gregor and Hevner
[10]. The general overview of ISDT, including the
kernel theories, meta-requirements (MR), metadesigns (MD), and testable hypotheses (TH),
corresponds to the method section of the publication
schema [10]. The MD in ISDT corresponds to the
artifact description section of the publication schema.
The evaluation section of the publication schema is
used to test the research hypotheses of ISDT.
We choose the cognitive dissonance theory
(CDT) as our major kernel theory. CDT considers a
privacy paradox as a cognitive gap between attitudes
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and actual behaviors. IS scholars have already
learned that the increase of PSR awareness reduces
consumers’ paradoxical behaviors [5, 12, 13]. To
improve PSR awareness, we adopt the information
processing theory (IPT) that can explicate the
relationship between information types and
individuals’ processing abilities toward the
information. Furthermore, we propose the privacy
and security risk control balance theory (PSR-CBT)
based on the control balance theory (CBT) that can
be used to explain consumers’ internal power
conflicts when disclosing their personal information.
Table 1 shows the components of the designed
PSR assessment framework following ISDT. MRs
are a set of goals for an artifact design [8]. This study
proposes three MRs. First, we aim to develop a
taxonomy of personal information types related to
IoT PSRs using an inductive approach. Second, we
design personal PSR scores, representing the level of
perceived IoT PSRs, based on the two kernel
theories, CDT and IPT. Last, we propose a new
design theory based on CBT.
MDs are a set of design elements aiming to meet
the MRs [8]. This study’s MDs consist of five design
elements: (1) a general process design for PSR
assessments, (2) the process design of personal PSR
scores, (3) the design of ten dimensions (personal
information types, weight impact factors, and
personal capabilities) for PSR scores, (4) a new
model of PSR scores, and (5) a new design theory for
PSR disclosures.
The last component of ISDT includes testable
hypotheses related to the designed artifact [8]. To
evaluate the performance of the proposed artifact,
PSR scores, our study provides three evaluation
approaches, including evaluation with visualizations,
consumers’ surveys, and experimental designs for
PSR scores.
Table 1. Components of the designed PSR
assessment framework

4. An IoT PSR Assessment Framework
In this DSR study, we adopt CDT and IPT as our
kernel theories to support the proposed assessment

framework for IoT PSRs. Before discussing the
theories, we first present general challenges in
privacy decision making and set up the boundary
conditions for this study.

4.1. Boundary Conditions of PSR Assessment
Acquisti and Grossklags [21] suggested three
challenges in privacy-related decision making.
Consumers have (1) incomplete information to make
PSR disclosures, (2) lack of ability to process their
information, and (3) various cognitive biases. We
will focus on the problem of having incomplete
information and infeasible processes. In particular,
for new IoT technology, few consumers understand
the vulnerability of IoT and the possibility of data
manipulation by vendors. If consumers had more
knowledge of IoT privacy and security issues, they
would probably be more conservative in purchasing
and using IoT devices. The proposed PSR assessment
framework will contribute to increasing consumers’
awareness about the IoT devices they use, how
significant the risks are, and how far they can control
their information. Even if consumers had complete
information, they would not be able to perfectly
process their detailed information because this
information is usually very complex [21]. The
proposed PSR assessment framework will also
contribute to improving consumers’ ability to
understand the details of IoT privacy and security
issues by visualizing consumers’ use of different data
types and their privacy control capabilities [22]. Last,
cognitive biases significantly influence consumers’
decision making with PSRs, but we consider this
factor to be beyond the scope of the current study and
leave it for future research.

4.2. Cognitive Dissonance Theory (CDT)
We leverage CDT [23] to explicate the
discrepancy between consumers’ attitudes toward
PSRs and the actual purchase and use behaviors of IoT
products and services.
When people exhibit a conflict between their
attitudes and their behaviors, this result is cognitive
dissonance. This cognitive dissonance leads to a
feeling of mental discomfort. One of the most
popular demonstrations of CDT is the “smoking
test”: A person acquires knowledge about smoking
from the media, friends, acquaintances, and
physicians. The knowledge that smoking is bad is
dissonant with the cognition that he or she keeps
smoking [23].
The principle of CDT explains that people
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want to avoid disharmony by changing their
attitudes or behaviors with an inner drive. CDT
suggests three ways to reduce dissonance. First,
people can adjust their attitudes, beliefs, or
behaviors to reduce their mental discomfort by
removing the conflict. In the case of IoT, if
consumers know that there is a serious PSR, they are
more likely to change attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors
around purchasing a product with high risks. However,
many individuals have difficulty changing their
behavioral responses, despite their well-learned
knowledge [23].
Second, people want to eliminate the
disharmony between attitudes and behaviors by
acquiring new knowledge that outweighs the
disharmonious beliefs [23]. With IoT, consumers
are likely to expect that IoT companies should
provide privacy and security protection by
implementing such features into their products and
services. They are also likely to expect that IoT
providers carefully protect the privacy and security
of consumers’ data collected through IoT. However,
in practice, there are many data breaches, and some
companies, such as Amazon and Google, use
consumers’ personal information to manipulate
their consumers and increase revenue [2, 18].
Third, people can diminish the importance of
cognition, such as attitudes and beliefs for their
cognitive consonance. People try to reduce
cognitive dissonance by making an excuse for their
behaviors, as mentioned in the example of smokers,
who despite knowing the fact that smoking is bad for
health [23]. For IoT products, consumers might
convince themselves that, even if their personal
information is leaked, it will not be that harmful
because “they have nothing to hide.” This, however,
may lead to potentially serious consequences for
everyday consumers, such as identity theft, harm to
credit scores, and the leak of embarrassing photos
or health conditions. The proposed PSR assessment
framework can help consumers switch from a
cognitive dissonance condition to a cognitive
consonance condition by visualizing the information
types shared with IoT, and how well they are able
to protect their personal information. The
improvement process of consumers’ awareness of
PSRs can be explained by IPT.

4.3. Information Processing Theory (IPT)
IPT originates from the cognitive process theory,
which deals with humans’ cognitive memories that

consist of sensory memory, short-term memory, and
long-term memory [24]. The information in sensory
memory is usually unconscious and only lasts for up
to three seconds. Short-term memory is also known
as working memory. The information in sensory
memory transfers to short-term memory and lasts for
15-20 seconds in short-term memory before
transferring to long-term memory. The amount of an
individual’s cognitive load, the number of repeats,
and individuals’ selective processing capability
collectively influence how information is processed
in the short-term memory. Although long-term
memory has much space, it relies on the quality of
the organization of the memory, and thus, people
cannot usually remember all the information in their
long-term memory [25].
The proposed PSR scores can improve
consumers’ ability to process their information in
working memory and long-term memory by
increasing their awareness, as well as their personal
capabilities to protect their personal information and
organizing their distributed information regarding
PSRs. Such improvement will occur because the PSR
scores will help consumers visualize their use of data
types, prior breach experiences, cultural impact, and
the level of privacy literacy with a spider map and
scores. Furthermore, the PSR scores will provide a
three-level classification of PSRs and display where
the consumers best fit [24].

4.4. MD1: The Process of PSR Assessments
The first MD is a general PSR assessment
process. Before designing the PSR scores in detail,
we need to have a general framework for evaluating
personal PSRs with IoT. First, we start with an
information collection process to establish the types
of PSRs. Because the concept of IoT may be too
broad, we focus on IoT technology which collects
data from various wireless sensors such as Amazon
EchoTM and Google HomeTM. Second, we identify
possible privacy risks and security vulnerabilities
based on the collected information. Third, we assess
the identified PSRs. However, existing risk
assessment developed for social networks might not
be applicable to IoT. To determine the level of PSRs,
we should find out the likelihood and impact of the
identified PSRs [26]. Thus, we determine the
likelihood and impact of potential risks. Based on the
likelihood and impact, we categorize information
types for PSRs. Last, we provide a personal privacy
and security evaluation result, which is then used to
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develop personal PSR scores.
This study follows MD1, which includes data
collection, identification of PSRs and vulnerabilities,
assessment of PSRs with the likelihood and impact
(see Table 2). For steps 4, 5, and 6 of MD1, we
suggest a matrix of personal PSR levels. The risk
levels are strongly associated with the risk likelihood
and impact [27]. When both factors are high, PSR is
the highest. Figure 1 presents the matrix of different
PSR levels, which influence the design of
information types and weight impacts for MD2-MD4.
To apply the last step of MD1 to PSR scores, we
propose the process of PSR scores as MD2.

presented in Figure 2, we will propose MD3 and
MD4.

Figure 2. The process of PSR scores

4.6. MD3: The Design of New Dimensions

(L: Low; M: Medium; H: High)

Figure 1. The matrix of PSR levels
Table 2. The general process of PSR
assessments

4.5. MD2: The Process of PSR Scores
In this meta-design, we propose a process of
generating personal PSR scores. First, we identify
PSRs in IoT technology based on existing literature
and experts’ opinions. Given a new IoT technology,
experts’ opinions are particularly important because
it is not easy to understand and assess the new
technology for novices. Furthermore, we use survey
data developed by professional survey firms [28, 29].
Second, we generate a taxonomy of IoT PSRs by
classifying personal information types. In particular,
IoT devices yield various information types that
could be breached and used as a tool to manipulate
consumers by the vendors [18]. Last, we quantify
PSRs as scores and then display the scores in a
visualization form [26].
Based on the overall PSR score design process

In this MD, we develop four new dimensions for
IoT information types based on an inductive
approach. As secondary data, we initially use the
surveys conducted in 2018 and 2019 by RSA which
is a professional survey company [28, 29]. The
results of these surveys indicate that financial and
banking information is the most significant threat for
IoT consumers, followed by security information
identity information, and personal activity
information. In particular, consumers’ activity
information, such as purchasing history and location
information, is introduced in new IoT technology
environments since vendors can manipulate
consumers’ purchasing behaviors or personalized
advertisements via consumers’ activity data [18, 30,
31]. The consumer survey result is summarized in
Figure 3. Interestingly, there are big cultural
differences in personal information types [28, 29]. For
example, US consumers are more sensitive to sharing
location data than German and French consumers. US
and French consumers are more generous than
German consumers in disclosing their information.
Early adopters want to purchase IoT devices and
services to improve their ability to achieve their goals,
for example the monitoring of diet using wearable IoT
devices [28, 29].

Figure 3. Consumers’ care about
information types
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Figure 4 shows the results of MD3. We start with
specific IoT information types such as credit card
numbers, passwords, social security number (SSN),
personal activities, and location data. Based on the
different types of IoT data, we synthesize and create
ten themes, such as financial, security, ID, family,
contact, activity, location, and time information.
These ten themes potentially reveal four new IoT
PSR dimensions: monetary, security, identification,
and manipulation risks. In practice, although we can
directly use the ten themes to analyze a consumer’s
personal PSR score, we abstract these ten themes to
four dimensions that can lead to a new theory in the
privacy and security area.

Figure 4. The IoT information type coding

Dixon and Gellman [14] classified consumers’
information types for purchasing as demographic,
contact,
vehicles,
lifestyle/interests/activities,
financial and economic, and financial and credit data.
However, the classification method does not directly
apply to IoT because IoT collects more data types.
Compared to Dixon and Gellman’s classification, the
proposed IoT information types adds security, ID,
family, location, and time information. Figure 5
shows the proposed ten IoT information types.

Figure 5. The proposed IoT information types

4.7. MD4: The Model of PSR Scores
This MD defines the calculation of personal PSR
scores that collectively consider four information
types, three weight impact factors, and three personal

capabilities. The proposed PSR scores show the level
of balance between two powers: personal information
disclosure power and personal information control
power. The personal information disclosure power is
calculated as the product of the four information
types and the corresponding weight impact factors.
The personal information control power is measured
based on three personal capabilities. The weight
impact factors positively moderate the relationship
between the information risk type and the PSR
scores. Volume, culture, and personal breach
experiences are the elements of the weight impact
factors. Volume is an important element used to
determine the weight of the impact of information
types on PSR since the impact of risks will fluctuate
according to the number of IoT devices, the number
of friends on social media accounts, the usage of
Cloud services, and the scale of disclosure [32].
Cultural differences also influence the PSRs
since culture determines the social norms and values.
Soares and Shoham [33] cite the definition of culture
from Sekaran in 1983 as “culturally patterned
behaviors are thus distinct from the economic,
political, legal, religious, linguistic, educational,
technological and industrial environment in which
people find themselves.” Hofstede [34] defines
culture as “the collective programming of the mind
which distinguishes the members of one human
group from another.” Hofstede’s four cultural
dimensions, such as masculinity and femininity,
uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and
individualism and collectivism, are the outcomes
from more than 100,000 IBM employees in 40
different countries [33, 34].
Prior studies found that previous experiences
play a significant role as a moderator between
optimistic biases and risk estimates at both a personal
level and a social level [35]. According to IBM
research, 28% of consumers have a data breach
experience [36]. “Users who have never experienced
a privacy breach are more trusting and link easily
with reciprocating users. However, after experiencing
a privacy breach, users become aware of the privacy
risks on SNS and use the permeability rules to more
cautiously share information” [37].
Personal capabilities negatively moderate the
impact of information types on the PSR scores. To
demonstrate the knowledge dimension in this study,
we define knowledge as a technical understanding of
the IoT and general computer-related techniques.
Based on Byrd and Turner [38], we chose to use the
term technical knowledge, which represents
programming languages, IoT devices and services,
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computer operating systems, expert systems or
artificial intelligence (AI), network management and
maintenance, developing Web or App-based
applications, and big data warehousing or data
mining skills.
Compared to the general knowledge of IoT
technology, privacy literacy focuses on privacy and
security. Prior scholars have suggested the concept of
privacy literacy and defined it in various ways [39].
Nevertheless, leading scholars have emphasized the
application of skills online as well as the knowledge
of privacy: “Online privacy literacy may be defined
as a combination of factual or declarative (“knowing
that”) and procedural (“knowing how”) knowledge
about online privacy” [40]. Thus, we define privacy
literacy as the ability to collect personal information
and apply practical skills online for personal data
protection and privacy regulation.
Self-efficacy is also one of the essential
constructs in privacy and security theories. Bandura
[41] introduced self-efficacy before developing the
social cognitive theory (SCT). According to the
advent and development of computer network
markets, computer self-efficacy (CSE) was suggested
as a targeted form of self-efficacy. Mobile computing
self-efficacy (MCSE) is a specific form of CSE for
mobile environments. With the dramatic increase in
the use of mobile computing devices, IS researchers
have differentiated the self-efficacy of a mobile
device from traditional self-efficacy and CSE, in
order to analyze their models more accurately [42]. In
this study, we follow the definition of self-efficacy,
suggested by Johnston and Warkentin [43]: “the
degree to which an individual believes in his or her
ability to enact the recommended response.”
We now describe how to calculate PSR scores
mathematically, with four IoT information risk types,
three weight impact factors, and three personal
capabilities. The amount of each information risk
type shared with an IoT device is multiplied by the
level of significance, which is estimated using
consumer survey results. Based on the survey results
in Figure 3, monetary risk information disclosure will
be the baseline risk because consumers worry the
most about money-related information disclosure [28,
29]. We set its level of significance to be a. Security
risk information disclosure is less concerned than
money-related information. Its level of significance is
β (β < a). Similarly, the level of significance for
identification risk information disclosure is set to δ (δ
< β) while that of manipulation risk information
disclosure is set to γ (γ < δ). The weights of the

information types can be adjusted over time, based on
the latest consumer surveys. For the calculation of the
consumers’ disclosing power, we multiply
information types and weight impact factors because
there is an individual difference, based on the
consumer’s network volume, culture, and previous
experience. To calculate personal capabilities, we
measure consumers’ knowledge about IoT or new
technology, self-efficacy, and privacy literacy via
survey methods. Finally, we normalize the overall
scores. Figure 6 shows the overall model expressed
as a mathematical equation. Figure 7 shows the
overall framework of the PSR scores. Figure 8
demonstrates the role of a moderator that moderates
the impact of consumers’ attitudes on their intention
to behave.

Figure 6. Mathematical equations of PSR scores

Figure 7. The conceptual framework of PSR
scores

Figure 8. The model of PSR scores

4.8. MD5: A New Design Theory
As a final MD, we propose a new theory, PSR-

Page 5082

CBT, grounded in CBT and IPT [24]. The proposed
PSR scores can contribute to not only supporting
consumers to move their information from the shortterm memory to the long-term memory by
quantifying and visualizing the PSRs, but also by
improving the identification of consumers’
tendencies and abilities.
CBT discusses two powers [6]. When one power
is stronger than the other, the stronger power can
attack or hurt the weaker one. This study uses the two
internal “powers” of personal information disclosure
and personal information control. The disclosure
power can be evaluated by information types and
weight impact factors. The control power can be
evaluated by personal capabilities. First, if the
disclosure power is stronger than the control power,
consumers are likely to disclose their personal
information with little hesitation. Although
consumers actively communicate with various
sensors and online friends via IoT, they would be
exposed to high risks. Second, if the disclosure power
and the control power move to equilibrium,
consumers will fall into a significant cognitive gap or
a privacy paradox and hesitate to disclose their
information. However, PSR scores can help increase
the awareness of their disclosure habits and personal
capabilities and reduce the cognitive gap. Third, if
the control power is stronger than the disclosure
power, consumers are not likely to disclose their
information.
In this case, consumers will face limitations in
various
communications
or
online
social
relationships, and could isolate themselves, although
their risks will be minimized. Using the equation in
Figure 9, we can conclude which power is stronger. If
the result is greater than 1, the disclosure power is
higher than the control power, and if it is less than 1,
the disclosure power is higher than the control power.
Using the PSR scores, consumers will be aware of
their current vulnerabilities, manage their personal
PSRs, and minimize their privacy cognitive gaps.

Figure 9. The discriminant of PSR scores

4.9. Visualization

Figure 10 is a simulated outcome with four new
personal information types, three weight impact
factors for the information types, and three personal
capabilities to control PSRs. This spider map shows
all the scores of the ten dimensions; consumers can
easily recognize their weak parts and strong parts.
This visualization will also display the result of the
PSR control balance: a warning phrase and graphical
signals.

5. DSR Evaluation
As an evaluation of our DSR approach, testable
hypotheses of ISDT are used to evaluate whether
MDs satisfy MRs [9]. In this study, we use an
experimental design to test three hypotheses for the
evaluation of our MDs.

Figure 10. The spider map of the outcomes

We will measure the way in which the change of
consumers’ awareness toward PSRs is improved
before and after having personal PSR scores. To
measure if consumers’ cognitive gaps are reduced,
we will provide three statements. (1) I feel my
awareness of PSRs improved after having my PSR
scores. (2) I intend to be more careful when using the
IoT after having my PSR scores. (3) I am willing to
change my behavior towards the use of IoT devices
after having my PSR scores.
The PSR scores are calculated by a consumer
survey. Table 3 shows the scales of the ten
dimensions for the consumer survey. All
questionnaires and demographic questions are
available upon request.
Table 3. The scales of the ten dimensions

Our testable hypotheses include the following:
TH1: The consumers who see the visualized PSR
scores have better awareness of PSRs than those who
do not.
TH2: The PSR scores have a negative influence on
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consumers’ cognitive gaps.
TH3: The PSR scores have a positive influence on
consumers’ behavioral changes.

6. Discussion
This study potentially contributes to minimizing
consumers’ cognitive gaps and improving
consumers’ awareness of PSRs by providing personal
PSR scores and visualizing the PSR scores with a
spider map and warning messages. We suggest new
classifications and dimensions toward IoT
information types, such as security, identification,
family, location, and time information. These
information types are likely manipulated by vendors
as well as hackers in IoT settings, since IoT devices
and services are naturally vulnerable toward PSRs.
Last, this research proposes a new design theory for
PSR disclosures called PSR-CBT that explicates
consumers’ internal assessments toward PSRs in IoT
settings by evaluating disclosing power and control
power. Furthermore, PSR-CBT can be generalized
for other consumers’ decision making when they
have two internal conflicting powers. For example,
when a person posts a sensitive picture on Facebook,
there may be a conflict between disclosure power and
control power in his or her mind.
However, this study has several limitations.
First, although the PSR scores help consumers to
increase their awareness of PSRs, the direct influence
of the cognitive gap between the attitude and actual
behavior is not easily measured since we should
measure the change of the consumers’ purchasing
behaviors. Second, PSR scores can be subjective until
we have sufficient PSR score data to compare
individuals to populations. Third, the weight for
information types and cultural differences can be
changed, since the individuals’ personalities and
experiences can be altered.
As the next steps, first, we can validate and
apply the proposed PSR-CBT to other fields to
generalize the theory. Although PSR-CBT is applied
to IoT settings in this study, PSR-CBT can be applied
to other privacy and security issues when consumers
make a decision. For example, when a person posts a
sensitive picture on Facebook, there may be a conflict
between disclosure power and control power in his or
her mind. Second, we can identify the distinction
between privacy and security in a future study
because privacy and security may have different
influence mechanisms on consumers’ decisions.
Third, future studies can carry out to identify

consumers’ trust issues toward IoT companies.
Fourth, although we presented three reasons for
privacy and security decision making, we did not
consider cognitive biases in this study. We thus
suggest further research on the relationship between
cognitive biases and the privacy calculus model [31].

7. Conclusion
The advent of IoT leads to a change in the use of
information types. Consumers face more serious
PSRs because of the new information types that can
be easily breached and manipulated by vendors.
However, many consumers have limited information
about IoT. Even consumers who have enough
information about IoT rarely take action to protect
personal information because of the cognitive gap.
This DSR study of personal PSR scores in the
IoT settings contributes to minimizing the cognitive
gap that explicates consumers’ paradoxical behaviors
and increasing the awareness of PSRs. We followed
two DSR methodologies, including ISDT and
publication schema for DSR to create the proposed
artifact of PSR scores based on CDT and IPT.
The PSR scores consist of three major parts and
ten dimensions in detail. IoT information risk types
have four dimensions; monetary, security,
identification, and manipulation risks. Weight impact
factors, composed of volume, cultures, and prior
experiences, play a role as a positive moderator
between IoT information risk types and personal PSR
scores. Personal capabilities, such as technical
knowledge, privacy literacy, and self-efficacy for IoT
PSRs, negatively moderate between IoT information
risk types and personal PSR scores.
The proposed PSR-CBT contributes to
consumers’ understanding of their behaviors toward
PSR disclosures by addressing the individuals’ two
internal powers. Future studies can develop the
concept of PSR-CBT and the PSR scores as a general
index that can be practically applied to consumers all
around the world.
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